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Introduction
It is widely recognized that the research by Milton Friedman characterizations, see Lucas (1994) and Bernanke (2002) .
This paper analyses the reasons that led Friedman and Schwartz to change their policy views between the late-1940s and the time of Friedman's first public presentation in 1958 of a rule under which the money supply would annually grow within the range of 3 to 5 per cent. 2 The emphasis in what follows will be on Friedman's views since, unlike Schwartz, he made his views public as they evolved and set them down in unpublished memoranda. 3 Nonetheless, in the correspondence between the two authors during the 1950s, Schwartz concurred with Friedman's evolving positions.
Briefly to anticipate, the main findings are the following.
• First, the decisive factor underpinning Friedman's switch to a moneygrowth rule was his empirical confirmation of the hypotheses that the Federal Reserve had initiated the Great Depression with its policy tightening in 1928 and 1929 and deepened the Depression with its policies beginning in 1930. 4 That confirmation, which demonstrated the damage that could be inflicted by inappropriate discretionary monetary policy, took years to develop. In the early-1950s Friedman had begun to consider only the hypothesis that the Fed had deepened the Depression.
By the mid-1950s he believed that his empirical work with Schwartz had 2 The 3 to 5 per cent money-supply rule would become the key feature of the monetarist policy agenda of the 1960s and the 1970s. 3 As an employee of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Schwartz was enjoined at the time from making policy recommendations in Bureau publications. 4 The two sub-hypotheses that the Fed (i) initiated the Great Depression and (ii) deepened the Depression are together known as the Monetary Hypothesis of the Great Depression.
confirmed that hypothesis, and he had begun seriously to consider the hypothesis that the Fed had initiated the Depression. The evolution of his thinking on a money-growth rule proceeded analogously: during the early-1950s he considered the possibility of such a rule as one among several rules to govern economic policy --nevertheless, he favored a rule under which fiscal policy would generate changes in the money supply;
by the mid-1950s, he had come to prefer a money-growth rule in his unpublished writings. By 1958, he believed that he had confirmed both hypotheses about the Fed's damaging role in the Great Depression; at that time he also made public for the first time his money-growth rule, which aimed to limit the harm that could have been inflicted by discretionary monetary policy.
• Second, Clark Warburton, an empirical economist who spent his career at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, appears to have played an important role in the transformation of Friedman's views. Heretofore, Warburton has been recognized as a pioneer monetarist, whose views, including those on the role of monetary forces in the Great Depression and on monetary rules, anticipated those of Friedman. 5 It has also been recognized that, beginning in the mid-1950s, Warburton commented on various drafts of A Monetary History. 6 Correspondence that we have uncovered suggests that Warburton had a direct influence on Friedman's 5 See Humphrey (1971; , Patinkin (1973) , Bordo and Schwartz (1979) , and Cargill (1979; .
6 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. xxii). views about the monetary origins of the Great Depression and, possibly, on monetary rules.
• Third, empirical data constructed by Friedman and Schwartz on the determinants of inflation during three wartime periods --the Civil War, World War I, and World War II --presented by Friedman in a 1952 paper, contributed to his shift to the position that monetary policy is more important than fiscal policy.
To substantiate these findings, we rely partly on unpublished and previously-uncited documents.
The remainder of this paper is comprised of four sections. Section 2 provides an overview of Friedman and Schwartz's respective policy views in the 1940s and early1950s. Section 3 provides an account of the Friedman-Warburton correspondence that took place during the course of 1951. As will be shown, Warburton's ideas about the Great Depression, the connection between monetary stability and the stability of the banking system, and monetary rules presaged Friedman's subsequent views on these issues. Section 4 describes the transformation of Friedman's views during the period from the early-1950s until the mid-1950s, which set the stage for his advocacy of a money-growth rule. Section 5 offers conclusions.
Early Policy Views
From mid-1941 through early 1943, Friedman was an economist with the Treasury Department in Washington. In May 1942, he testified before the House Ways and Means Committee on the question of how to contain inflation. To do so, Friedman argued, consumer spending would have to be restricted. The best way to do that in turn, he argued, was via income taxation. The other ways of avoiding in inflation that he singled out were price controls and rationing, controls on consumer credit, reduction in government spending and the selling war bonds to the public.
He made nary a mention of money or of monetary policy (Friedman, 1942) . Looking back on that episode over a half a century later Friedman wrote: "The most striking feature of this statement is how thoroughly Keynesian it is" (Friedman and Friedman, 1998, p. 112) .
By the mid-1940s, Friedman already had begun to alter his views. In 1946, he joined the faculty at the University of Chicago. 7 In a University of Chicago Round what he referred to as "two pillars to the [inflation] problem." The first was "the large volume of money and money substitutes in the hands of the public" and the second, "the great volume of unused lending power in the hands of the banks." (Friedman, Hart and Jacoby, 1946) . In further contrast to his 1942 congressional testimony, Friedman argued against price controls, including rent controls, and also against the Federal Reserve's policy of pegging the interest rates on government securities.
Five years later in another statement before Congress on "The Failure of the Present Monetary Policy" he sounded much more like a quantity theorist. He wrote:
With a rise of over 8 percent in demand deposits, it is little wonder that personal income rose about 10 percent, wholesale prices about 11 percent, cost of living by nearly 6 percent. It is no accident that these figures are so nearly of the same magnitude. This is about as clear a case of purely monetary inflation as one can find (Friedman, 1951a He did, however, continue to give fiscal policy a strong billing.
Friedman again pointed to the importance of monetary policy in combatting inflation in his contribution to a symposium on "The Controversy over Monetary
Policy," published in the Review of Economics and Statistics the same year (Friedman, 1951b) . His views stood in contrast to those of the other participants in the symposium, Lester Chandler, Alvin Hansen, Seymour Harris, Abba Lerner and James Tobin, all of whom looked to fiscal policy and in some instances direct controls to contain the inflation that was then underway.
Friedman began his collaboration with Schwartz on A Monetary History in 1948.
At the time, he estimated that the research project would take three years to complete (Hammond, 1996) ; it ultimately took 15 years as the scope of the data to be constructed, assembled, and evaluated increased over time. (Schwartz, 1948a) . Friedman wrote back on April 22, 1948 as follows: "I apparently did a very poor job of explaining myself" (Friedman, 1948a) . He then provided a detailed explanation of the reasons underlying his interest in a series on government obligations, to which, on May 12, 1948, Schwartz replied, "light has dawned… I now see the point of the series you have in mind" (Schwartz, 1948b (Schwartz, quoted in Nelson, 2004, p. 595) . 10 For discussions of Friedman's Bayesianism and of his empirical approach more generally see Pelloni (1987 Pelloni ( , 1996 , Lothian (2009 Lothian ( , 2016 , and Dwyer (2016) .
The problem is one that is common in scientific work. A preliminary decision ... must be made. Yet the decision can be made properly only on the basis of the research in which the preliminary decision is to be used. Strictly speaking, the "best" way to define money depends on the conclusions that we reach about how various monetary assets are related to one another and to other economic variables; yet we need to define "money" to proceed with our research. The solution, also common in scientific work, is successive approximations. (Friedman and Schwartz, 1970, p. 91) He preferred to look at the data from a variety of perspectives and take the weight of the evidence as a whole to see how well the data supported the hypothesis under investigation. His emphasis on support of a hypothesis as opposed to failure to reject it is, as Dwyer (2016) Friedman (1948b) believed that rigidities in the price structure and lags in response to changes in policies made it difficult to achieve full employment under any proposal designed to mitigate the cycle. 12 Simons attributed the origin of the Great Depression to a fall in confidence resulting from the stock market crash of October 1929. For discussions of Simons' views, see Friedman (1967 ), Patinkin (1979 , Tavlas (1997; and Rockoff (2015) .
Friedman discussed the implications of fractional-reserve banking for the total quantity of money. During the "panic of 1933" and other "currency panics,"
attempts by the public, he argued, to move into more-liquid forms of money led to reductions in the quantity of money: "For cyclical analysis, interest attaches not only and perhaps not mainly to the quantity of circulating medium but also to its form and the interchangeability of different forms. The most dramatic monetary episodes of business-cycle history all relate to attempt on the part of the general public to change the form in which they hold the circulating medium, in particular, attempts to convert bank deposits into hand-to-hand currency" (1948c, p. 2). Once a movement from bank deposits to currency had started during a business contraction, there is "hardly any limit to the velocity of circulation" (1948c, p. 3).
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Following Simons, Friedman believed that the way to deal with the inherent instability of the banking structure was to require 100 per cent reserve holdings against all deposits, thereby severing the link between the conversion of deposits into cash and changes in the money supply. Under the Friedman, and earlier Simons'
proposal, banks would become warehouses of funds; the banks would provide check-clearing services for their depositors, charging fees for the services provided.
In addition, Friedman thought that 100 per cent reserves would reduce government intervention in lending and investing. The idea here was that the recognition that government has a responsibility for the provision of money leads to the view that institutions producing the money supply should be controlled and regulated, resulting in more-intrusive regulations of banks' lending and investing activities than those of other financial institutions.
Over time, Friedman changed his views substantially with regard to policy as his empirical work progressed In an interview conducted by John Taylor over a half century after he had published his 1948 policy proposal, Friedman had this to say:
In [that] paper, I was at the point where I would say money is important but the quantity of money should vary countercyclically --increase when there was a recession and, the opposite, decrease when there was an expansion. Rules for taxes and spending that would give budget balance on average but have deficits and surpluses over the cycle could automatically impart the right movement to the quantity of money.
Then I got involved in the statistical analysis of the role of money, and the relation between money and money income. I came to the conclusion that this policy rule was more complicated than necessary and that you really didn't need to worry too much about what was happening on the fiscal end, that you should concentrate on just keeping the money supply rising at a constant rate. That conclusion was, I'm sure, the result of the empirical evidence (Taylor, 2001, p. 119).
Schwartz
To our knowledge, the only account of Schwartz's policy thinking during the 1940s or early-1950s -published or unpublished -is in her two-volume coauthored book with Arthur D. Gayer and W.W. Rostow, The Growth of the British Economy
1790-1850: An Historical, Statistical, and Theoretical Study of Britain's Economic
Development (Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz, 1953 ).
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The book was started and largely completed in the early-1940s, 15 but because of wartime and other delays did not get into print until 1953. In the book, the authors state that they had adopted a Keynesian perspective in interpreting movements in economic activity (Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 1953, p. xii) . They attributed the main drivers of the business cycle to be changes in both investment spending and exports (Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 1953, p. 532) . They asserted that money played --at best --a passive role in the business cycle: "monetary phenomena can be most usefully regarded … as a reflection of more deep-seated movements. This is not to deny any autonomous influences from the side of the money supply [since] easy money market conditions were required before general prosperity could develop" (Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 1953, p. 559) . We owe an especially heavy debt to Clark Warburton. His detailed and valuable comments on several drafts have importantly affected the final version. In addition, time and again, as we come to some conclusion that seemed to us novel and original we found that he had been there before (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. xiii ).
Warburton and Friedman

Warburton's Views on the Great Depression and monetary policy
Warburton's major studies began appearing in the mid-1940s. Using the Fisherine equation of exchange as his analytical framework, he emphasized the importance of empirical verification for competing theories (Humphrey, 1971, p. 15; Cargill, 1981, p. 91 showing that declines in the growth rates of bank reserves and the money supply during those years below their long-term trends occurred following the Fed's adoption of a tight monetary policy in the late-1920s, which, he argued, preceded the 1929 decline in economic activity by several quarters (Warburton, 1950, p. 190 ).
Warburton believed that, throughout the Great Depression, the Fed had had the capacity to undertake expansionary open-market operations and that these operations would have increased the money supply. He argued further that, had the Fed maintained a steady money growth rate of 3 per cent per annum --the rate experienced during the period 1923-28 --beginning in 1929, the United States would have experienced "a moderate business depression … in 1930," but not a Great Depression (quoted from Bordo and Schwartz, 1979, p. 239) .
Second, Warburton believed that what he called "erratic" money growth was largely responsible for economic instability. Based on the past growth rate of per capita real output, which Warburton estimated to have been two per cent a year, and a secular decline in the velocity of circulation of money, which Warburton estimated to be 1.5 per cent annually, he concluded that a four to five per cent annual rate of increase of the money supply would provide stable prices at full employment output levels over the long run, mitigating extreme fluctuations in economic activity (Cargill, 1979, p. 441) .
The 1951 Warburton-Friedman Correspondence
The The trigger for the correspondence was an article, "Commodity-Reserve
Currency," by Friedman, published in June 1951. In that article, Friedman (1951c) reiterated his views about the desirability of controlling the money supply through the fiscal budget and the 100 per cent reserve proposal. 18 In a letter, dated June 22, system, when such a system is guided by a central bank which uses its power to promote stability of the monetary unit (Warburton, 1951d) .
Based on a letter sent from Warburton to Friedman dated July 18, 1951, it is clear that the latter had responded to Warburton's comments about what Friedman considered to be the "inherent instability" of a fractional-reserve banking system.
Friedman evidently argued that currency is "high powered" because a shift from bank deposits into currency leads to a reduction in the quantity of money while a shift from currency into deposits leads to an increase in the quantity of money. 19 Warburton disagreed that such a result is inevitable under a fractional-reserve system that has a central bank. The monetary authorities, he believed, could take action to offset an increase in the currency-to-deposit ratio or in the ratio of reserves-to-deposits held by the banks, leaving the money supply unchanged. If the disturbing results of the old system were not to be repeated under the new system it was necessary for Federal Reserve officials to recognize that when deposits are withdrawn by the public in currency the Reserve Banks should acquire a corresponding amount of assets from the commercial banks, in one way or another, without disturbing the reserves on which deposits are based. Now this is, and was from the beginning of the Federal Reserve system, a simple matter of decisions of Federal Reserve officials. Ever since establishment of the Federal Reserve banks there has been no reason in the banking structure for disturbances in the total quantity of money to result from the transformation of deposits into currency. The difficulties of the 1930s that did in fact result from such a transformation were in no sense due to faults in banking structure --they were directly due to the fact that the officials of the Federal Reserve, and presumably their economists also, had not learned how it was supposed to operate (Warburton, 1951b Friedman, in his reply, apparently argued that the reduction in the quantity of money during the Great Depression was, at least in part, the result of increases in the currency-deposit and reserve-deposit ratios as people shifted their holdings of money from deposits to currency and banks increased their holdings of reserves. This reconstruction of the missing correspondence is evidenced in a letter from
Warburton, dated August 6, 1951.
It is apparent that you do not realize the background of my charge that the difficulties of the 1930s were due to incompetence on the part of central bank officials rather than to a defect in the banking and monetary structure. That charge is based on the simple but obvious fact that in the early 1930s the Federal Reserve authorities acted as though they knew nothing about the principles of currency management developed in the long period of agitation for bank reform between the 1860s and the creation of the Federal Reserve System, and the fact that there is nothing in the publications of the Federal Reserve Board or the writings of its economic staff of that period to indicate that they did know anything about those principles. My own personal contacts with the Board's staff in 1932 and since that time also provide no evidence that they understood those principles (Warburton, 1951c) .
To support his claim that the Fed officials had displayed "sheer incompetence, presumably based on ignorance" 21 during the Great Depression, Warburton referred 1/50 including those obligations" (Warburton, 1951c) . From these data, Warburton concluded that the "virtual stoppage of the rediscounting process was not due to forces outside the Federal Reserve. It was due directly to the combination of policies deliberately adopted by the Federal Reserve Board" (Warburton, 1951c) .
Friedman responded to Warburton with a four page (single-spaced) letter on September 3, 1951. The main points were as follows.
The Performance of the Fed. Friedman wrote that "I, too, have just read
Goldenweiser's book and agree that it shows a lamentable deficiency of understanding of basic principles." 24 Friedman agreed with Warburton "that in practice the reserve system has been a complete and tragic failure, that it did not cure in practice the 'perverse' elasticity of hand-to-hand currency that was the main objective" (Friedman, 1951d) . 24 It is not perfectly clear from the above quotation that Friedman read the book in response to his receipt of Warburton's earlier letter. Given that almost one month had passed since Warburton's letter of August 6, 1951 , that circumstance appears likely.
The Great Depression. Friedman (1951d) response to something that Warburton had written in an earlier, missing letter, or (ii) 25 In their assessment of the "free-gold problem," Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 406) concluded that "the problem of free gold was an ex-post justification for policies followed, not an ex ante reason for them." Regarding the availability of eligible collateral, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 404-05) concluded: "member banks could have been encouraged to increase their discounts. At all times there was ample eligible paper in the portfolios of member banks." in response to Warburton's published writings advocating such a rule, or (iii) as an idea that Friedman had independently contemplated in his own thinking. Given that
Friedman would not again raise the possibility of a money-growth rule for another five years, and also given his familiarity with Warburton's published work, one of the former two possibilities appears likely.
In his letter of September 3, 1951, Friedman considered three alternative rules: Friedman believed that they would have to be accompanied by legislation "instructing the managers" to implement the rules, thereby reducing the scope for discretion in the implementation of the rules (Friedman, 1951d) . Our difference of opinion is on the conclusions we draw from this period. You interpret it as a product of ignorance and incompetence and, in effect, say "throw the rascals out" and put in competent and wise people. For the moment let me grant first, that the failure is attributable solely to ignorance and incompetence, and the competent and wise people in charge would run the system so that it would avoid past failures and no longer contribute to instability. What is the likelihood that competent and wise people will be chosen, or that if chosen, they will be allowed to continue in charge?
Is it a pure accident that the system was in the hands of incompetent and ignorant people for 40 years? Wisdom and competence involves readiness to do the opposite of what everyone else is doing, which is hardly the way to win friends and influence people (Friedman 1951d ).
Thus, to guard against both the possibility that incompetent monetary authorities are at the leadership of the Fed and the possibility that competent but politicallyinfluenced authorities are at the helm, Friedman believed that a rule based on the quantity of money would have to be reinforced with legislation, further limiting the possibility of discretion (beyond the limitation imposed by the rule itself).
Discussion
The following points merit comment. First, Warburton appears to have with the problem of speculation in corporate stocks and prevention of the use of bank loans for this purpose" (Warburton, 1951c, p. 3) . 26 In his published writings of the late-1940s and early-1950s, Warburton was more specific than in the above-cited letters to Friedman about the Fed's role in initiating the Great Depression (see Bordo and Schwartz, 1979, p. 239; Cargill, 1979, p. 432) . Fourth, in contrast to Warburton, Friedman favored monetary rules, not only to prevent the possibility of mistakes by incompetent officials, but also to prevent the possibility that Fed officials might become subjected to political pressures. Consequently, a rule that involves "managers" in its implementation, such as a monetary growth rule, should be embedded in legislation.
The transformation
Early-1950s to mid-1950s
26 In early 1928, the Fed began tightening its policy stance in order to stem speculation in the stock 
The unpublished 1951 document does not provide information indicating
precisely when (i.e., month) during the year it was written 27 and so it is not possible to determine whether it was written before, during, or after the period of Friedman's 1951 correspondence with Warburton. Thus, it is not possible to determine if the views in the paper were influenced by that correspondence. In terms of policies, Friedman referred to the "suggestions" (Friedman, 1951e, p. 3) made in his 1948
paper, "A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability." Friedman argued that the data showed "the monetary system" had played "an essentially passive" role 27 The main purpose of the paper was to describe the data Friedman and Schwartz had collected and constructed, and the gaps in the data that needed to be filled.
in minor business cycles, but "an active and important role" in major cycles (Friedman, 1951e, p. 2 Friedman (1952, p. 158) pointed out that "in all three cases the rises in prices was almost of precisely the same magnitude, so this critical variable is under control." 28 The determinants of the three inflations that he assessed were the following: (a) "federal expenditures in each year as a fraction of national income;" (b) "the fraction of government expenditures financed through taxes;" (c) the increase in output in each war; (d) wage and price controls; and (e) the quantity of money per until of output (Friedman, 1952d, pp. 158-9) . Friedman found that price behavior was proximately explained by the stock of money per unit of output; it could not be satisfactorily explained by an analysis that excluded the stock of money. He also found that none of the other variables helped to explain any of the three inflations. 28 Friedman showed that prices approximately doubled from the outbreak to the end of each of three wartime episodes, although the durations of the episodes differed.
These results influenced his thinking about the relative importance of monetary and fiscal policies. He set-down a notion --to our knowledge for the first time --that would become a recurrent theme in his writings, namely, that there are "two competing theories of income determination: the quantity theory of money and the income-expenditure theory … the quantity theory asserts in essence that the velocity of circulation of money is an empirical variable that behaves in a stable or coherent fashion; the income expenditure theory, that the propensity to consume, or the consumption function, is the empirical variable that behaves in a stable or consistent fashion" (Friedman, 1952, p. 161) .
1954.
The lecture delivered in Sweden shows further changes in Friedman's thinking about the role of the banking structure in the business cycle and about the (Friedman, 1954, p. 60) . Second, the share of government obligations in banks' balance sheets, which Friedman estimated to be about 15 per cent of banks' deposit liabilities in 1929, had risen to more than 50 per cent, which "greatly reduces the potential effects of changes in the private demand and supply for credit on the quantity of money" (Friedman, 1954, p. 60) . As a result, deposits (like currency) had increasingly become a direct liability of the government.
Friedman argued that a "consequence [of this development is] that it greatly reduces the potential effects of changes in private demand and supply for credit on the quantity of money. The private lending activities of banks are no longer the dog; they are threatening to become the tail" (Friedman, 1954, p. 60) . Third, the removal of gold from public circulation in 1934 loosened the link "between [gold and] the internal supply of money" (Friedman, 1954, p. 61) . The combined effect of the three changes was to "eliminate as a practical possibility anything approaching a collapse of the American banking structure" (Friedman, 1954, p. 61) . 29 Friedman's position on the Great Depression had also evolved. First, the evidence had convinced him that by the summer of 1931 there had been signs of an economic revival. "But the decline", he argued, "did not come to an end." The Fed officials took "strong deflationary measures, putting up the bank rate more sharply and suddenly than at any previous time in their history --and this after two year of economic contraction" (Friedman, 1954, p. 64) . 30 Second, Friedman had also begun to assess the Fed's policies beginning in 1929 (but not 1928 as he would do subsequently). While he did not argue that the Fed had initiated the Great Depression, he did argue that its policies, beginning in 1929, had contributed to a worsening of the Great Depression: "From 1929 to 1931 the Reserve System was largely passive. It allowed the stock of money to decline by about 10 per cent and banks to fail in a steady if not spectacular stream" (Friedman, 1954, p. 64) . 29 As the recent experience during the euro-area crisis demonstrates, however, a large share of government obligations on banks' balance sheets can be a source of shocks if the sovereign is not creditworthy.
30 The Fed's tightening occurred after Britain's departure from the gold standard in September 1931. The main findings were as follows: (1) "both indicators [of economic activity] agree that the five contractions since 1879 with the largest percentage decline in activity are 1893-94, 1907-08, 1920-21, 1929-33, and 1937-38" 33 (Friedman and 31 Chapter 1 was ten pages in length and Chapter 2 was 68 pages in length. Many of the pages have faded and are difficult, if not impossible, to read. 32 To compute rates of change, Friedman and Schwartz used first differences of logarithms, effectively eliminating trends from the data. , 1907-08, 1920-21, and 1937-38 . Each of those periods was accompanied by an appreciable decline in the stock of money, the most severe accompanying the 1929-33 contraction."
I. By April
34 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 274 ) dated the peak in the level of the money supply as August 1929. 35 The methods were "the step approach" and the "specific cycle method".
with findings to attribute both the initiation and the deepening of the Great Depression to monetary forces.
Chapter 2 also referred to three alternative monetary rules: "a rule of maintaining the stock of money constant; or of increasing it at a constant rate of 6
per cent a year… Or [a] rule of maintaining the stock of money at whatever level was required to keep a given price index stable" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1956 I do not think we ought or can in this place and context outline a fullblown or comprehensive theory. What it seems to me we want to do is to make a number of major points suggested pretty directly by the empirical evidence; (1) there are long swings in the money series that correspond in time to the previously noted long swings in the output series; (2) these long swings are reflected most directly and clearly in prices and money national income; (3) we have reasonably straightforward explanations of a historical or episodic character for most of the major swings in the money series; (4) if the swings in money are the primary mover --and the wider amplitude in them and in prices than in output makes this plausible --then an episodic explanation seems to be consistent with the evidence rather than a cyclical one; (5) whether this be right or not, no study of these supposed long cycles can afford to neglect the swings in money (Friedman, 1956a, p. 2).
Two issues merit comment regarding the above summary points made by Friedman. First, points (1) and (2) imply that long swings in the money supply do not seem to affect the long-run real growth rate of the economy. This conclusion follows from the observation that long swings in money are "most directly and clearly reflected in" long swings in nominal income, with the latter swings predominantly comprised of price-level changes. Consequently, changes in the quantity of money do not affect real economic growth in the long run. It also follows that monetary policy should be based on a rule that aims to achieve price-level stability since (1) discretionary policy can be harmful, as evidenced by the experience of the Great Depression, and (2) System's reaction in the fall of 1931 to England's going off the gold standard" (Friedman, 1956b, p. 3) .
Regarding the choice of monetary rules, Friedman stated: "I must confess that I am myself somewhat in a state of flux about the best answer" (Friedman, 1956[b] , p.
5). He considered his earlier proposal that the fiscal budget be used to control the money supply to be "more sophisticated than is necessary" (Friedman, 1956b, p. 5) .
In its place, he proposed --for the first time --a money-growth rule:
36
Consider the very simple rule: the monetary authorities do nothing whatsoever except see to it that the stock of money increases by simply 4% per year… I think that any student of monetary experience and policy who compares month by month what the Federal Reserve actually did with what they would have done under the 4 % rule will conclude that in perhaps as many as 90 % of the months, they would have done better if they had followed this simple rule … it seems to me we might at least try this simple-minded rule for a time and see how well it works before we introduce further complications (Friedman, 1956b, p. 7) .
In his 1956 lecture, Friedman also discussed his 100 per cent reserves proposal.
He believed that it had become less necessary because "unnoticed by anyone, we have in effect moved something like half or two-thirds of the way forward the essence of a hundred per cent reserve system since the 1930s, when the proposal first received much attention" (Friedman, 1956b, p. 8) . What accounted for this "unnoticed" change toward a 100 per cent reserve system? Friedman singled-out the factors that he had cited in his 1954 lecture in Sweden --the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the increased share of government financial instruments on banks' balance sheets, and the departure of the United States from the gold standard.
36 Tavlas (2015) claimed that Friedman first proposed his money growth rule in 1958.
The 1958 public announcement and the Great Depression
It was left for Friedman to announce his money-growth rule publically. That announcement came in 1958 as part of his statement to the Congressional Joint Economic Committee (JEC):
An essential requirement for the avoidance of either substantial inflation or substantial deflation over the coming decades is the avoidance of a substantially more rapid or a substantially less rapid increase in the stock of money than the 3 to 5 per cent a year required for price stability. A substantially more rapid rate of growth in the money supply will inevitably mean inflation; conversely, continued inflation of substantial magnitude cannot occur without such a large rate of growth in the money supply. A substantial slower rate of growth in the money supply, let alone an absolute decline, will inevitably mean deflation; conversely, continued deflation of substantial magnitude cannot occur without a small negative rate of growth in the money supply (1958, p. 185) .
In his JEC statement, Friedman argued that the historical evidence showed that there is a strong regularity between changes in the stock of money per unit of output and changes in prices in the same direction. Friedman (1958, p. 173) noted that, while this regularity "tells nothing about direction of influence", the variety of monetary arrangements -for example, the gold standard, flexible exchange rates, regimes with and without a central bank -over which this regularity has been observed "supports strongly . . . [the view] that substantial changes in the stock of money are both a necessary and sufficient condition for substantial changes in the general level of prices" (1958, p. 173 ). Friedman did not refer to the need to embed his proposal in legislation, although he would subsequently do so (see Friedman, 1960 The credit for singling-out this passage belongs to Rockoff (2006) .
Discussion
A key factor underlying the money-growth rule was (Friedman, 1960, p. 93) . He also acknowledged, however, that changes in the "monetary structure --notably federal insurance of bank deposits, the altered asset structure of banks, and the altered role of gold" had rendered "a repetition of major mistakes like those made during the inter-war period highly unlikely" (Friedman, 1960, p. 44) . Nevertheless, he argued that "a merit of the [money-growth] rule [is] that it provides insurance against … major mistakes … . I would be tempted to add that new mistakes are legion and insurance against major mistakes differing in kind from those in the past … is well worth while" (Friedman, 1960, p. 94, italics supplied) . In the preface to this edition, Schwartz distanced herself from the theoretical framework in the book:
Schwartz: post-1963 views
With respect to the basic theoretical analysis presented in this book, further study and reflection have led to an amiable divergence of views between us that should be shared with our readers … one of us (A.J.S.) has concluded that three aspects of the analytical approach of the study require modification in light of recent theoretical and empirical research: (1) the role assigned to monetary policy; (2) the interpretation of the behavior of interest rates; and (3) the emphasis on relative price rather than price level changes (Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 1975, p. ix, original italics) .
Schwartz went on to point out that the analysis in both editions of the book was "a faithful reflection of the outlook of the economics profession … in the aftermath of the economic debacle of 1929-33." As a result of that episode, the profession had questioned "the efficacy of monetary policy" (Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 1975, pp. ix-x) . Schwartz concluded that research since the publications of the first edition 38 A representative example of her views on monetary policy is contained in the paper "Why Money
Matters" (Schwartz, 1969) .
of the book required that "attention [be paid] to monetary relationships in the study of British business cycles … and to the … monetary effects of the cyclical and secular behavior of interest rates" (Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 1975, p. xiii) . 39 Those modifications, she stated, "would entail revisions of some of the conclusions of these volumes … while monetary changes influence output change in the short run, in the long run the rate of monetary growth affects prices primarily" (Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 1975, p. xiii) .
Conclusions
In his essay, "The Monetary Theory and Policy of Henry Simons," Friedman (1967) contrasted his view that monetary policy should be conducted on the basis of a constant money-growth rule with Simons' preference for a rule based on pricelevel stabilization. 40 Friedman asked, "What explains this contrast [in monetarypolicy rules]?" (1967, p. 84) . His answer was the following: "A few facts, which we now know and he [Simons] did not know have made all the difference … The facts have to do primarily with the Great Depression of 1929-1933" (1967, p. 84 
The role of money
• In the late-1940s, Friedman believed that the economy is "inherently unstable" because of the endogeneity of the money supply under a fractional-reserve banking system.
• In the late-1950s, Friedman thought that money is the "primary mover"
of the business cycle and that changes in the money supply produced by monetary policy can be a source of destabilizing shocks.
The 100 per cent reserve proposal
• In the late-1940s Friedman favored 100 per cent reserves to deal with the destabilizing effects of flights into currency under a fractional-reserve banking structure.
• In the late-1950s he believed that adherence to a money-growth rule would prevent incipient flights into money from turning into "currency panics." The 100 per cent reserve proposal had effectively been rendered redundant by changes in the banking structure.
Policy rules
• In the late-1940s Friedman favored a rule under which fiscal policy would be used to generate changes in the money supply with the aim of stabilizing output at full employment, and open-market operations would be abolished.
• In the late-1950s he advocated a rule under which the money supply would grow annually within a range of 3 to 5 per cent in order to maintain a stable price level and to stabilize the economy. Open-market operations would be used to achieve and maintain that rate of growth of the money supply. Counter-cyclical policy could not, he believed, influence long-term economic growth.
We have also documented the role played by Friedman and Schwartz's confirmation of the Monetary Hypothesis of the Great Depression in the evolution of decade, also played key roles in the evolution of Friedman's thinking, however.
Nonetheless, as the above remarks by Friedman indicate, the accumulation and interpretation of data on the Great Depression --and, in particular, the destabilizing role played by monetary policy throughout that episode -arising from his work with Schwartz on A Monetary History were decisive in the evolution of his thinking toward a money-growth rule.
Finally, we have argued that Clark Warburton may well have played a greater role than has been recognized in drawing Friedman's attention to (a) the crucial part played by the Federal Reserve during the Great Depression, (b) the idea that a fractional-reserve banking system need not be "inherently unstable" since the monetary authorities can take countervailing measures to offset contractions in the money supply that result from flights into currency, and (c) the benefits of a rule based on the growth of the money supply.
To verify these and other ideas empirically and make them implementable required years of careful and detailed study and research, including the development of meaningful data that could be subjected to analysis, which 
